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NATURE OF APPEAL 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Honorable Raymond Uno presiding, granting 
Summary Judgment as to all causes of action in plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Beehive contends that the District Court erred in 
granting Summary Judgment relating to the contract for the 
purchase of one million brick due to the existence of substantial 
questions of fact relating to the existence of the contract, as 
well as substantial questions of law relating to the compliance 
with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
2. Beehive complied with the requirements of the Statute 
of Frauds in relation to its distributorship arrangement with 
Robinson and, as such, the District Court erred in granting 
Summary Judgment. 
3. The District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
as to Beehive's Third Cause of Action due to the existence of 
questions of fact regarding Robinson's attempts to interfere with 
contracts of Beehive. 
4. Beehive conferred substantial benefit upon Robinson by 
serving as a distributor at a time when Robinson had no other 
distributor in the Salt Lake area. Beehive accepted the temporary 
distributorship with the understanding that they would be granted 
a permanent distributorship if they could adequately represent 
the products of Robinson. Beehive should be fairly compensated 
for the benefit which they conferred upon Robinson. 
ARGUMENT I 
SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW SHOULD 
HAVE PRECLUDED THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RELATIVE TO THE ONE MILLION BRICK ORDER 
In granting summary judgment, a court must establish whether 
all material facts are uncontested. In the event that material 
facts are contested, the court must view the facts in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Helgar Ranch v. 
Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980). 
In order to determine the relevant facts, the courts have 
established rules whereby parties may submit facts to the court 
for consideration. Rule 3(g) of the Local Rules of Practice for 
the Third District Courts requires that each memorandum in 
support of summary judgment include a statement of "material 
facts" supported by references to the record. Rule 3(h) of the 
Local Rules of Practice for the Third District Courts establishes 
a similar requirement for the memorandum of opposing parties. 
In its opening brief, Beehive pointed out several instances 
where Robinson failed to support its "undisputed facts" with 
accurate citations to the record (Appellant's Brief at 10-22). 
In its Memorandum in Support, Robinson claims facts which were 
not supported by the record (Record at 38-43) and, as such, these 
facts should not have been considered to be uncontested by the 
District Court. Robinson's failure to support its "undisputed 
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facts" with proper citations is even more important in this case 
because the District Court was unable to verify the facts by 
checking the citations submitted by Robinson. Most of the 
"undisputed facts" submitted by Robinson in its Memorandum were 
supported by citations to depositions which were never published 
and which were not filed with the court until approximately 13 
days after the Summary Judgment was granted. 
Beehive's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment also 
raises several questions of fact relative to the issues of offer, 
acceptance, confirmation and performance of the contractual 
agreements of the parties (Record at 63). These factual 
differences are discussed in detail in Appellant's opening Brief. 
Robinson does not, however, address any of these questions 
of fact. Instead Robinson chooses to dismiss the factual 
questions by claiming that issues of offer, acceptance, 
confirmation and performance are questions of law, not fact. 
Robinson seems to be practicing the old legal maxim: 
When the law is against you, argue the facts 
When the facts are against you, argue the law. 
While issues such as offer, acceptance, confirmation and 
performance do involve substantial issues of law, these issues 
cannot be viewed in a vacuum. They can only be properly decided 
when applied to the facts of the particular case. 
Because Robinson has chosen not to argue the factual 
discrepancies presented in Beehive's brief, it is assumed that 
Robinson conceeds that questions of fact did exist. As such, no 
further discussion will be presented in this reply brief. 
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With regard to the issues of law, Robinson states in its 
brief that in order for contracts to be enforceable, there must 
be (1) an oral agreement and (2) a writing or confirming 
memorandum of the oral agreement (Respondent's Brief at 10). 
Robinson supports this argument by citing to Section 70A-2-201 
Utah Code Annotated (1987). Beehive draws the court's attention 
to three issues relevant to this argument. First, Section 70A-2-
201 does not require that there exist an oral agreement between 
parties. Neither the language of the statute nor the official 
comments to Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code require 
the existence of an oral agreement. 
Second, even if we assume that an oral agreement is 
required, Robinson has failed to indicate that an oral agreement 
was not made. Robinson asserts that the oral agreement was not 
complete because this agreement was contingent upon Robinson's 
ability to make a brick of the right color and texture. Robinson 
supports this statement with a citation to Record 94 at 73-75 
(Deposition of Monte Jones). This citation to this record does 
not support Robinson's claim. Appellant is unable to find any 
place in pages 73-75 which indicate that the order was 
conditioned upon Robinson's making the right color. In fact, 
lines 1-3 of page 75 indicate that Robinson's employee knew that 
at least some of the order would be filled with substitutions 
(Record 94 at p. 75). 
Third, the alleged conditional acceptance of Robinson was 
not raised as the defense in Robinson's answer, nor was it raised 
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as a material fact in Robinson's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Accordingly, the so-called conditional acceptance issue is 
irrelevant for purposes of this review, and only serves to cloud 
the issues presented on appeal. 
Robinson's brief also states that all of the test runs were 
unsatisfactory (Respondent's Brief at 10). As noted in Beehive's 
opening brief, Robinson's citation to the record in support of 
this claim does not indicate that the bricks were completely 
unsatisfactory. It is undisputed that both parties expressed a 
desire for the brick to improve, if possible, but in general the 
test runs were accepted and used by Beehive and its customer 
(Record 95 at 111-116) . Appellant finds it curious that Robinson 
does not address this issue in its brief, but chooses only to 
parrot this same misleading statement. 
In addition, the issue of acceptance or rejection was raised 
as a disputed question of fact in Beehive Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment (Record at 63) and, as such, 
should have been resolved in Beehive's favor. 
Robinson further contends that the agreement was not 
confirmed in writing. Robinson mistakenly argues that Beehive 
intended to "confirm" the oral agreement by sending a purchase 
order. This contention is incorrect. Beehive has not and does 
not claim that the purchase order acts as a confirming 
memorandum. Robinson next asserts that the letter of April 17, 
1986 cannot be construed to be a confirming memorandum since it 
"does not indicate that a contract had been made between the 
5 
parties" and that "the letter stated that the order for special 
color of bricks could not be fulfilled" (Respondent's Brief at 
page 12). Once again, Robinson attempts to mislead the court. 
The letter of April 17, 1986 (Addendum) states clearly in two 
different places that the order had been received and that it 
would be filled. Paragraph 5 indicates that the special color 
could not be produced, but that Robinson would allow 
substitutions in color. The next paragraph indicates that 
Robinson would be willing to fulfill all existing orders and then 
specifically listed the Emerson Larkin order of one million 
provincial antique brick as an existing order. This letter 
certainly raises a question of fact as to whether or not an order 
was received and accepted by Robinson, and whether or not 
Robinson breached the agreement by failing to provide the brick 
as promised. 
Finally, Robinson addresses Beehive's argument relative to 
Section 70A-2-206. In is opening brief, Beehive contended that 
under this section of the code, a merchant could be held to have 
accepted an offer if he either shipped or promised to ship 
conforming or nonconforming goods. Assuming for a moment that 
Beehive has not complied with the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds, this rule constitutes an exception to the statute based 
upon performance. The shipments of goods or the promise to ship 
goods by its terms suggests the existence of a contract since 
people rarely ship goods without having a commercial reason to do 
so. Robinson either misunderstands or ignores Section 70A-2-206 
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by contending that the statute of frauds is not qualified by 
other code provisions. This argument is made without any 
substantiation or authority. The official comments to Section 
2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code do not support Robinson's 
claim that the Statute of Frauds operates independently of other 
sections of the Code. On the other hand, the official comments 
to Section 2-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code indicate just the 
opposite by stating: 
"The beginning of performance by an offeree 
can be effective as acceptance so as to bind 
the offeror only if followed within a 
reasonable time by notice to the offeror." 
It stands to reason that if performance constitutes a contract 
capable of binding an offeror, it certainly should create a 
contract capable of binding the offeree as well. 
Beehive acknowledges that the part performance clause of the 
Statute of Frauds as set forth in Section 70A-2-201 Utah Code 
Annotated (1987) is limited to that portion of a contract which 
is, in fact performed. However, partial performance can also 
create an acceptance of an offer under Section 70A-2-206 as 
indicated by the official comments set forth above. 
ARGUMENT II 
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST 
WHICH SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED THE 
GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RELATIVE TO THE ISSUE OF BEEHIVE'S 
DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT WITH ROBINSON 
In its opening brief, Robinson indicates that 
distributorship agreements for the sale of goods is governed by 
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Article 2 of Utah's Uniform Commercial Code, and that in order 
for a memorandum to be binding, it must indicate that a contract 
for sale "has been made" as indicated in Robinson's brief 
(Respondent's Brief at page 15). Beehive acknowledges these 
arguments and agrees with these principles of law. However, 
Beehive has repeatedly contended that the July 22, 1985 and the 
April 17, 1986 letters serve as sufficient memoranda to support 
the existence of a distributorship. Robinson does not dispute 
Beehive's contention that some type of distributorship agreement 
had been made (Respondent's Brief at page 16). The only question 
that remains, therefore, is what the terms and conditions of that 
agreement or agreements were. Robinson argues that the 
distributorship arrangement was, in effect, two separate 
agreements: One for a temporary distributorship and the other 
for a permanent distributorship. Robinson further contends that 
while they did enter into the temporary distributorship that the 
permanent distributorship arrangement was never entered into by 
the parties. This contention ignores certain evidence which was 
presented by Beehive in their Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment (Record at 64). In Beehive's Statement of Additional 
and Disputed Facts, it states that the temporary distributorship 
was to be converted to a permanent distributorship if Beehive was 
able to outperform its competitor, Interstate Brick, and as such, 
disputes the "two contract" theory of Robinson. Beehive supports 
this claim by referring to the Deposition of Randall Browning at 
page 75, where we find the following dialogue: 
8 
Q: What did Dee Young tell you, if anything, about the 
terms under which you would be able to sell Robinson 
Brick products? 
A. I was told that we were going to be able to sell the 
brick, Robinson Products, That Interstate was going to 
be able to sell the brick and that we were more or less 
in a horse race to see who sold the most to see who 
would end up with the exclusive distributorship. It 
was our understanding Robinson's policy was not to have 
a split distributorship but to have one exclusive 
distributor, so we went to work and just did what we 
could, promotion wise, to promote the brick and to do 
the best job we could. 
(Record 96, at page 75.) 
Continued on in this deposition, we find the following 
dialogue: 
Q. As of the Spring of 1985, you knew that you were being 
granted a temporary distributorship; is that correct? 
A. I don't know that we considered it temporary at that 
time. 
Q. Well you knew that at some point down the road Robinson 
Brick was going to appoint an exclusive distributor. 
A. And we were given the understanding that if we 
outperformed our competition that the distributor would 
be us. 
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Q. But you are also aware it was possible it would not be 
you. 
A. If we did not outperform them sales wise, that would be 
correct. 
Q. You knew it may be somebody besides yourself; is that 
right? 
A. Based on performance, that's correct. 
(Record 96 at pages 75-76.) 
This testimony clearly supports Beehive's contention that a 
single distributorship was contemplated and that it would be 
terminated only if Beehive failed to sell more goods than 
Interstate Brick. Although Robinson contends that the 
distributorships were two separate agreements, if we view the 
facts in a light most favorable to Beehive, it must be concluded 
that the distributorship arrangement was not two separate 
agreements but was one agreement subject only to certain 
conditions of performance. As a result, the District Court 
erred by either failing to view the disputed facts in a light 
most favorable to Beehive or, in the alternative, in failing to 
correctly apply the law to these facts. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
ROBINSON DID NOT INTERFERE WITH BEEHIVE'S 
ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS CONTRACTS 
In its opening brief, Beehive argued that representatives 
from Interstate Brick Company, acting as agents for Robinson, 
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contacted Emerson Larkin in an attempt to fill the one million 
brick order previously submitted by Emerson Larkin through 
Beehive. It is undisputed by Robinson that Emerson Larkin had 
placed an order with Beehive for one million brick. In spite of 
this fact, however, Robinson continues to claim that this 
contention was not supported by the record. Beehive refers the 
court to its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment where it contended that clients were contacted by 
representatives of Robinson in an attempt to fill the one 
million brick order (Record at 64). Beehive supported its 
position by referring to the Deposition of Randall Browning 
(Record 96 at 118). As noted in Beehive's opening brief, Mr. 
Browning testified that Emerson Larkin, a customer of Beehive 
Brick, had in fact been contacted by Interstate Brick in an 
attempt to persuade Mr. Larkin to cancel his order with Beehive 
Brick. Robinson seems to argue that because Randy Browning did 
not have any personal knowledge of communications between 
Robinson and Interstate Brick that Robinson would not be 
responsible for the activities of its new distributor. However, 
this argument was not raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment 
and, as such, is not appropriate for this appeal. 
Furthermore, Robinson does not deny that Interstate 
contacted Emerson Larkin in an attempt to complete the million 
brick order. Certainly Robinson would be responsible for the 
acts of its agents and that the activities of Interstate Brick 
certainly would constitute an attempt to interfere with the 
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contractual relationship that existed between Emerson Larkin and 
Beehive Brick. Accordingly, it appears that there was at least 
some question as to whether or not Robinson would be responsible 
for the attempted interference with the contractual relationship 
between Beehive and Emerson Larkin, and that the court improperly 
granted summary judgment as to this issue. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
BEEHIVE HAD NOT PROVIDED GOODS 
AND SERVICES TO DEFENDANT 
In Beehive's opening brief, it is argued that Beehive 
provided goods and services to Robinson by maintaining a 
dealership agreement for approximately one year. In so acting as 
a distributorship, Beehive maintained a market position for 
Robinson's products and thereby conferred a benefit. Beehive 
recognizes that the record is somewhat sparse as to the nature 
and scope of these benefits; however, it should be noted that the 
record is equally sparse as to statements which would support 
Robinson's contention that no goods and services were provided. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
when the record did not support this conclusion. 
ARGUMENT V 
ROBINSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
BEEHIVE SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In its opening brief, Robinson requests attorney's fees 
incurred in responding to this appeal. Specifically, Robinson 
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suggests that Beehive's appeal is frivolous, having no reasonable 
legal or factual basis* Beehive contends that it has acted in 
good faith in submitting this appeal and, as such, Robinson 
should not be awarded attorney's fees. To the contrary, Beehive 
contends that it should be awarded costs and attorney's fees as a 
result of Robinson's failure to address Beehive's primary 
contention regarding questions of fact which exist relative to 
Beehive's First Cause of Action. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court incorrectly granted Robinson's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The judgment of the District Court should be 
reversed and a trial awarded on the issues raised in Beehive's 
Complaint. Beehive should be awarded costs and/or attorney's 
fees incurred in presenting this appeal. 
DATED this // day of April, 1988. 
/f/ 
STAHfORD NIELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 278-7755 
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WIW Third District Local Rules 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH 
The following local rules of the Third Judicial 
District Court modify and supplement the Rules of 
Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of 
the State of Utah promulgated on June 30, 1983, 
and rescind the local rules of the Third Judicial 
District Court effective April 1, 1984 These rules 
ire effective as of June 1,1987 
tak 1 AHtgaaeat of cites la Silt Lake Coaaty 
Rak 1 Ajrigaaeat of cam la Toook aad Saamh 
Coaatfet 
gait 3 Law mi B O O M fair l iar 
l i k 4 Lfcaitadoe oa discovery tad aiocftoas 
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Rak a Pretrial cafeoiar 
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gak I Doajctfk Rctatiooj Cf iaalaaj f r 
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Rak 11 A*oatJoat 
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Rak 13 Maboa* la caaeaMaaic 
Rak 14 Rdalcd caact aa—Hag la JaveoJk Coart 
Rak IS Certfflcatftoa af Dfctfrkt Coorl Caact to Javeatk 
Coart 
Rule 1 Aastf aaseat of cases la Salt Lake Coaaty. 
(a) All civil, criminal and domestic relations cases 
filed in Salt Lake County shall be assigned on a 
random basts at the time of filing to an individual 
judge who will hear all matters in the assigned case 
(b) Name of judge on pleading* Any pleading 
filed in a criminal or civil case after the case has 
been assigned to a judge must have the name of the 
judge who has been assigned to the case on the face 
of the pleading below the number of the case 
(c) Ex parte and emergency matters When the 
judge assigned to a case is unavailable to consider ex 
parte and emergency matters for a period exceeding 
one work day the absent judge's clerk will inform 
counsel of a judge authorized to handle such 
matters Other judges will not consider proposed 
orders on cases not assigned to them, except upon a 
showing of exceptional circumstances which in the 
interest of justice require immediate action 
(d) Spouse Abuse Act orders Stipulated or 
default orders pursuant to the Spouse Abuse Act 
which are a result of a hearing before the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner may be presented to any 
judge for signature 
Rule 2 AstrgBBaeat of cases la Tooek aad Sasasalt 
Coaaties 
(a) A judge will be assigned for six month terms 
to Tooele and Summit Counties, during which time 
he or she will hear all matters in those counties, 
except cases individually assigned, as provided in 
part (b) of this rule At the end of the six month 
term, the newly assigned judge will assume all 
ongoing matters in those counties 
(b) Upon motion of either party, the presiding 
judge may assign cases of unusual complexity to an 
individual judge who will hear all matters on the 
assigned case 
Rale 3 Law aod asotloa caleadar 
Rules 2 7 and 2 8 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts of the State of Utah shall not apply 
to motions filed in the Third Judicial District Court 
(a) All law and motion matters will be heard by 
the judge assigned to the case These matters will be 
set on a regular law and motion calendar as arra-
nged with the clerk of the judge assigned to the 
case Ex parte matters based upon stipulation will be 
presented only to the judge assigned to the case 
(b) Counsel shall contact the court and receive a 
date for hearing on the regular law and motion 
calendar, or may file a written request that the 
matter be resolved without hearing based upon the 
briefs submitted 
(c) Orders to show cause and other matters requ-
iring written notice will be heard only after written 
notice, which shall be served not less than five (5) 
days prior to the date specified in the notice for 
hearing, unless the court for good cause shown shall 
by order shorten the time for notice of hearing 
(d) Motions based upon depositions or supported 
thereby shall not be heard unless the depositions are 
filed in the clerk's office at least forty-eight (48) 
hours before the hearing on the said motion 
(e) Affidavits not filed within the time required by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be rec-
eived, except on stipulation of the parties or for 
good cause shown Courtesy copies of all affidavits 
shall be given to the judge within the time limits 
required by the Utah Rules of Cm) Procedure, and 
shall indicate the date upon which the matter is set 
for hearing Such copy shall be clearly marked as a 
courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court 
( 0 AH motions except uncontested or ex parte 
matters may be accompanied by a brief statement of 
points and authorities, and any affidavits relied 
upon in support thereof Points and authorities 
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed 
five (5) pages in length, exclusive of the statement of 
material facts as hereinafter provided, except as 
waived by order of the court on ex parte applica 
tion 
(g) The points and authorities in support of a 
dispositive motion shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to 
H which the movant contends no genuine issue exists 
The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sen-
tences, and shall refer with particularity to those 
portions of the record upon which the movant 
relies 
(h) The points and authorities in opposition to a 
dispositive motion shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists 
Each fact in dispute shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences, and shall refer with particula-
rity to those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies and, if applicable, shall state 
the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's 
facts that are disputed All material facts set forth 
in the statement of the movant shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment, 
unless specifically controverted by the statement of 
the opposing party 
0) If a memorandum of points and authorities is 
filed in support of a motion it must be served on the 
opposing party or his counsel and filed with the 
court no later than ten (10) days before the date set 
for heanng If a responsive memorandum is filed it 
shall be served upon the opposing party or counsel 
» ° ? * £ . ° For AatotatfoBg, cooaalt C O D E • C o s Anaotatk>a Service 5 5 7 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: Section 4, Uniform Sales 
Act (which was based on Section 
17 of the Statute of 29 Charles 
II). 
Changes: Completely re-
phrased; restricted to sale of 
goods. See also Sections 1—206, 
8—319 and 9—203. 
Purposes of Changes: The 
changed phraseology of this sec-
tion is intended to make it clear 
that: 
1. The required writing need 
not contain all the material terms 
of the contract and such material 
terms as are stated need not be 
precisely stated. All that is re-
quired is that the writing afford 
a basis for believing that the of-
fered oral evidence rests on a 
real transaction. It may be writ-
ten in lead pencil on a scratch 
pad. It need not indicate which 
party is the buyer and which the 
seller. The only term which must 
appear is the quantity term 
which need not be accurately 
stated but recovery is limited to 
the amount stated. The price, 
time and place of payment or de-
livery, the general quality of the 
goods, or any particular warran-
ties may all be omitted. 
Special emphasis must be 
placed on the permissibility of 
omitting the price term in view of 
the insistence of some courts on 
the express inclusion of this term 
even where the parties have con-
tracted on the basis of a publish-
ed price list. In many valid con-
tracts for sale the parties do not 
mention the price in express 1 2 - 2 0 1 
terms, the buyer being bound to U. C. C. 
pay and the seller to accept a rea-
sonable price which the trier of 
the fact may well be trusted to 
determine. Again, frequently 
the price is not mentioned since 
the parties have based their 
agreement on a price list or cata-
logue known to both of them and 
this list serves as an efficient 
safeguard against perjury. Fi-
nally, "market" prices and valua-
tions that are current in the 
vicinity constitute a similar 
check. Thus if the price is not 
stated in the memorandum it can 
normally be supplied without 
danger of fraud. Of course if 
the "price" consists of goods 
rather than money the quantity 
of goods must be stated. 
Only three definite and invar-
iable requirements as to the mem-
orandum are made by this sub-
section. First, it must evidence a 
contract for the sale of goods; 
second, it must be "signed", a 
word which includes any authen-
tication which identifies the par-
ty to be charged; and thirdr St 
must specify a quantity* 
2. "Partial performance" as a 
substitute for the required memo-
randum can validate the contract 
only for the goods which have 
been accepted or for which pay-
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: Sections 1 and 3, Uniform 
Sales Act. 
Changes: Completely rewritten 
in this and other sections of this 
Article. 
Purposes of Changes: To make 
it clear that: 
!• Any reasonable manner of 
acceptance ia-intended .to-be re-
garded aaayailabkunteafi the of-
feror has made quite clear that 
it_wilLMt J&_ &e_£e£tab)e. For-
mer technical rules as to accept-
ance, such as requiring that tele-
graphic offers be accepted by tel-
egraphed acceptance, etc., are re-
jected and a criterion that the 
acceptance be "in any manner 
and by any medium reasonable 
under the circumstances," is sub-
stituted. This section is intend-
ed to remain flexible and its ap-
plicability to be enlarged as new 
media of communication develop 
or as the more time-saving pres-
ent day media come into general 
use. 
2. Either shipment or a 
prompt promise to ship is made a 
proper means of acceptance of 
an offer looking to current ship-
ment. In accordance with ordi-
nary commercial understanding 
the section interprets an order 
looking to current shipment as 
allowing acceptance either by ac-
tual shipment or by a prompt 
promise to ship and rejects the 
artificial theory that only a 
single mode of acceptance is 
normally envisaged by an offer. 9 - 2 0 6 
This is true even though the Ian- ~ p p 
guage of the offer happens to be # * 
"ship at once" or the like. 
"Shipment" is here used in the 
same sense as in Section 2—504; 
it does not include the beginning 
of delivery by the seller's own 
truck or by messenger. But 
loading on the seller's own truck 
might be a beginning of per-
formance under subsection (2). 
3. The beginning of perform-
ance by an offeree can be effec-
tive as acceptance so as to bind 
the offeror only if followed with-
in a reasonable time by notice 
to the offeror. Such a beginning 
of performance must unambigu-
ously express the offeree's inten-
tion to engage himself. For the 
protection of both parties it is 
essential that notice follow in 
due course to constitute accept-
ance. Nothing in this section 
however bars the possibility that 
under the common law perform-
ance begun may have an inter-
mediate effect of temporarily 
barring revocation of the offer, 
or at the offeror's option, final 
effect in constituting accept-
ance. 
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April 17, 1986 
Mr. Randy Browning 
Beehive Brick 
244 South 500 West 
Salt Lake pity, UT 84101 
Dear Randy: 
Thank you for the very cordial meeting we had on Tuesday. 
I'm disappointed that the distributor relationship must be 
broken entirely at this time. 
I think that it is important to put down in waiting what we 
discussed as far as clearing out existing orders. 
1. All existing orders must be picked up on or before 
May 16, 1986. (After this date, all existing orders 
will be cancelled.) 
2. No new orders are to be accepted by Robinson Brick Co. 
3. Existing orders may not be increased. 
4. The existing credit limitations, as established by Jim 
Harris of Robinson Brick Company, remain in effect. 
5. The existing order of 1,000,000 Provincial Antique 
(special color) for Emerson Larkin cannot be produced. 
We will allow substitutions with the following: Dover 
Gray, Heritage Antique, Provincial Antique and 
Provincial Antique Special Lot. 
The following is a current list of open orders we are 
willing to fill, provided inventory is available: 
REMAINING 
ROBCO • BRICK NAME ON ORDER 
26917 Buckwheat 2,000 
19165 Dover Gray KS 1,938 
27092 Mission Autumn Gold 18,000 
31030 Rustic Buff Sp. Lot. 500 
27006 Colonial Grain 100 
26919 Provincial Antique 16,000 
P.O. Box 5243 • 1845 West Dartmouth • Denver, Colorado 80217-5243 • (303) 781-9002 
Mr. Randy Browning 
Beehive Brick 
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Emerson Larkin Order 
040496 Provincial Antique 1,000,000 
(Dover Gray, Prov. Antiq., Hert. Antiq.) 
Sincerely, 
ROBINSON BRICK COMPANY 
OY[QnA 
Monte S. Jones, Manager 
Distributor Sales Division 
MSJ:SAL 
